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The Disconnect Between Tax Concepts and the
World of Fact: State Law as the Gatekeeper
William B. Barkert
I. INTRODUCTION
Income tax in the United States celebrated its one hundredth
anniversary in 2013.1 The legislation's promise to the American people
was that a tax on net income was "in response to the general demand for
justice in taxation, and to the long-standing need of an elastic and
productive system of revenue."2 Income was chosen as the basis of the
system because "[t]he tax upon incomes is levied according to ability to
pay, and it would be difficult to devise a tax fairer or cheaper of
collection."3 The effect of income taxation would be to "equalize the tax
burden."4
The promise of income taxation depends on its ability to directly
grasp the socio-economic conditions of human experience in a way that
assesses those essentials necessary for fair and effective income taxation.
In most cases, tax law does this effectively. In some cases, however, there
is a significant disconnect between the way tax laws assess the factual
basis for tax rules and concepts and the way economics or finance would
do so. This disconnect may result in an assessment of the fiscal facts of
the taxpayer's activities that is an inaccurate assessment of economic
reality. Consequently, this disconnect reduces the scope of income tax
law's charge to assess taxes equitably based on ability to pay. Moreover,
the exploitation of this disconnect is the basis for many tax avoidance
strategies.
The principle reason behind tax law's failure to grasp economic
reality at times is the primacy of state law, private law, or legal form in the
method of the jurist.5 The state laws referred to herein are primarily the
t Polisher Family Faculty Scholar and Professor f Law, Penn State Dickinson Law.
1. The Income Tax Act was passed pursuant to the authority of the Sixteenth Amendment that
gave Congress the power to tax people on their income. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; see 1913 Income
Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § I(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167.
2. H.R. REP. No.63-5, at XXXVI (1913).
3. Id. at XXXVII.
4. Id.
5. Though the distinction is not very important in the United States, many national legal
systems distinguish private law, which is concerned with the legal relations of individuals and entities
in civil society, and public law, which takes as its subject matter the relationships between individuals
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private law systems of property, contracts, inheritance, and the family.
Though the object of income taxation is to tax income, legislatures take
many different approaches to the ultimate tax assessment based on the
different characteristics of the source6 and the unique characteristics of the
taxpayers.7 This legislative judgment can be based on various shades of
economics, justice, and politics, resulting in a legislative determination
that these differences exhibit contrasting elements that warrant differences
in tax liabilities.8 These differences can lead to large variations in tax
liabilities.
In order to bridge the gap between tax law and its application, the
interpreter must determine (1) the raw facts, (2) the proper
characterization of the facts, and (3) the tax meaning of the terms used in
the tax act. Private law controls this process in two ways. First, where the
words of the statute are common private law terms, tax rules, concepts,
and standards are not independently derived and directly applied to the
raw facts, but are instead viewed as private law categories. This approach
incorporates by reference a complex set of private law facts that are
relevant to private law objectives. In other cases, the tax law does not use
common private law terms. In these circumstances, though the meaning
of tax terms is not controlled by private law meaning, the critical facts of
taxation depend upon the legal context of the fiscal and social relations.
Limiting tax meaning to private law considerations can, in some cases,
distort tax law's complete assessment of the taxpayer's situation. One
important reason for this possible distortion is the differences in objectives
of the private law and the tax law. Private law's principle purpose is to
facilitate and sanction the existing economic and social relations that are
normal or typical.9 In contrast, tax law's principle purpose is to raise
revenue on a fair and efficient basis using a comprehensive approach to
or entities and government. See William B. Barker, Expanding the Study of Comparative Tax Law to
Promote Democratic Policy: The Example of the Move to Capital Gains Taxation in Post-Apartheid
South Africa, 109 PENN ST. L. REv. 703, 707 (2005). Public law includes such fields as taxation,
constitutional law, and administrative law. Private law covers influential subjects for taxation
including property, contracts, family law, labor law, and law of artificial persons. In civil law
countries, private law is often called civil law because much of it is contained in the Civil Codes;
whereas in the United States private law is often called state law because most of American private
law is the common and statutory law of the state governments. See Roscoe Pound, Public Law and
Private Law, 24 CORNELL L. Q. 469, 470 (1939); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968).
6. Compare I.R.C. §§ 1, 61 (2012) (the treatment of interest as ordinary income), with I.R.C.
§§ I (h)(1 1), 61 (2012) (the treatment of dividends taxed as net capital gain).
7. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 63(c)(3), (f)(1)(A), (g), 7703(a) (2012). Congress chooses to tax people
in different ways on the basis of their age, providing an extra standard deduction for those 65 and
older, and marital status. Id. A different situation is where Congress provides different tax treatment
based on the kind of activity the taxpayer is engaged in, as in the case of business as compared with
nonbusiness bad ebts. Id. § 166.
8. See generally William B. Barker, The Concept of Tax, A Normative Approach, in THE
CONCEPT OF TAX 21 (2008).
9. See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 5-9 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing the role of
exchange and that of promise).
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the totality of the taxpayer's activity. 10 Where private law purposes differ
from the purposes behind tax law, tax law that follows private law
characterization may fail its objective.
Because private law establishes a system that makes economic
enterprise possible, one ordinarily can presume that taxpayers chose a
particular legal form in order to achieve fairly well-understood economic
effects. Where legislatures decide to impose different tax consequences
on the basis of different economic consequences, it is logical that the
legislature would often use a shorthand reference to private law categories
due to their usual economic consequences. Sometimes, however, private
law can be out of sync with important aspects of economic and social
conditions that may be critical to the goals of taxation. After all, private
law assessment is only one perspective on human activity. On its own,
private law can hardly provide comprehensive knowledge of the full
richness of human activity which may be necessary for fair and equitable
taxation. Tax interpretation has other non-legal sources of knowledge
available which can complete the picture more in accord with policies and
goals of tax incidence. In part, these differences in private and tax law's
objectives can be seen by observing how the interpretation and application
of tax concepts to the facts of the taxpayer's situation demonstrates that
tax law shifts between accurate and inaccurate depictions of economic
conditions. This paper will analyze this phenomenon by exploring the role
legal form plays in the cognitive structure, the legal method, and the
reasoned explanations of tax law's interactions with factual conditions.
This analysis will show the consequences of shifting between abstract and
mediated legal reasoning dependent on legal form and practical and
immediate legal reasoning dependent on fact and the interdependence of
tax law and socio-economic conditions. Where the legal form created by
taxpayers lacks economic or social relevancy, that legal form contradicts
the underlying rationale of tax legislation, and it should not be followed
blindly. Thus, the disconnect between tax concepts and economic reality
is not inevitable. This paper will examine how interpretation in tax law
can and does break away from the dominance of private law
considerations.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF PRIVATE LAW IN THE INTERPRETATION OF TAx
LAW
Private law in taxation supports the liberal traditional or the right of
liberty, that is the liberty of the citizen to be free from an overreaching
10. JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 5 (5th ed. 1987).
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government, the freedom of property, and the freedom of contract," by
playing two important roles in taxation. The first rests on the assumption
that tax law, when it uses terms found in private law, adopts the private
law meaning for its terms. The second is the assumption that even where
tax law uses terms to directly describe economic or social relations, those
relations can only be seen through the context of private law rights and
obligations.
A. Assigning Private Law Meaning to Tax Statutes
Everyday life has a legal setting. Private law provides a necessary
condition for the existence of civil life. It provides the contractual
framework for making exchange relations possible. It provides the rules
and conditions for determining property interests in the world's resources.
From this, scholars of American tax law like Boris Bittker have concluded
that tax terms are almost always "abbreviated references to these
substantive rights of private law."'2 This view is supported by the
traditional view of tax interpretation in the United States as follows: "it is
a settled rule that tax laws are to be strictly construed against the state and
in favor of the taxpayer."'3 This doctrine of statutory construction is said
to be "founded so firmly on principles of equity and natural justice, as not
to admit of reasonable doubt."' 4 Consequently, the starting point in
interpreting tax legislation is state private law. For example, in
Commissioner v. Brown, 15 the Court stated:
The transaction was a sale under local law. . . . "Capital gain" and
"capital asset" are creatures of the tax law and the Court has been
inclined to give these terms a narrow, rather than a broad, construction.
A "sale," however, is a common event in the non-tax world; and since it
is used in the Code without limiting definition and without legislative
history indicating a contrary result, its common and ordinary meaning
should at least be persuasive of its meaning as used in the Internal
Revenue Code.16
This view is even more forcefully adopted in civil law countries
where the judicial view has generally been that "the tax consequences
attached to each legal construction of a transaction are the intended tax
results for the underlying factual situation."17 The doctrine adopted by
11. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Taxation in a Lockean World, 4 Soc. PHIL & POL'Y 49 (1986);
see generally GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX: ANALYTICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION (1980).
12. BORIS BITTKER & MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS
1-17 (1988).
13. NORMAN J. SINGER, 3A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 66.01, at 1 (5th ed.
1992).
14. Cahoon v. Coe, 57 N.H. 556, 570 (1876).
15. 380 U.S. 563 (1965).
16. Id. at 569-71 (citation omitted).
17. See Frans Vanistendael, Judicial Interpretation and the Role ofAnti-Abuse Provisions in Tax
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civil law jurisdictions is understood to be a consequence of the principle of
legality, which requires that taxation can only be imposed by statute, and
the mandate of the statute must be carried out by strict interpretation.18
This exception is in stark contrast to the usual civil law constitutional
requirement that specifically prohibits the strict or literal interpretation of
law. 19 This general approach is also adopted in Commonwealth
countries20 and the United Kingdom.21 A United Kingdom court put it
this way: "[I]t is not the economic results sought to be obtained by making
the expenditure that is determinative of whether the expenditure is
deductible or not; it is the legal rights enforceable by the taxpayer that he
acquires in return for making it." 22
One reason for this conclusion is that private law, like income tax
law, in most civil and common law countries, is national law. This leads
most courts to conclude that the legislature, which is responsible for both
private law and tax law, attaches the same meaning to legal terms used in
its tax laws as that found in private law.23 The result follows that the
private law characterization is the tax law characterization of the facts.24
Thus, most systems rely on only indirect interpretation of social facts.
This traditional approach depends on separate, but related, assessments.
The first is that there is an infallible inner consistency of the law.25 The
tax law and private law understanding of the facts must be the same.
Second, the private law legal form of the taxpayer's activity is always an
adequate reflection of the taxpayer's fiscal situation.26 Consequently, the
private law point of view is always in sync with the objective and accurate
assessment of the tax law.27
Indeed, one author has suggested that tax law has a characteristic that
separates it from other forms of law, because the central concept of
taxation, "income, is a fiction, [a pure invention for income tax
legislation], that does not have independent existence in the world of
Law, in TAX AVOIDANCE AND THE RULE OF LAW 133 (Graeme S. Cooper ed. 1997). See also Hans
Gribnau, Equality, Legal Certainty, and Tax Legislation in the Netherlands: Fundamental Legal
Principles as Checks on Legislative Power: A Case Study, 9 UTRECHT L. REV. 52 (2013).
18. Vanistendael, supra note 17, at 135.
19. Graeme Cooper, Conflicts, Challenges and Choices-The Rule of Law and Anti-Avoidance
Rules, in TAX AVOIDANCE AND THE RULE OF LAW 13, 27 (Graeme S. Cooper ed. 1997).
20. See, e.g., Barker, supra note 5, at 721, 724-25.
21. See William B. Barker, Statutory Interpretation, Comparative Law, and Economic Theory:
Discovering the Grund ofIncome Taxation, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 821, 827-30 (2003).
22. Europa Oil (NZ) Ltd. v. IRC [No. 2] [1976] 1 All ER 503 (PC) at 508.
23. See Sture Bergstrdm, Private Law and Tax Law, 23 SC. ST. L. 31, 38 (1979) (Sweden).
24. See Lord Advocate v. Countess of Moray [1905] AC 531 (HL) at 540.
25. See Vanistendael, supra note 17, at 135.
26. Id.
27. Id. See, however, the discussion below of the tax doctrines sham, simulation, and abuse of
law that are based on the conclusion that even the taxpayer did not intend the consequences of the
legal form. The existence of these tax doctrines would seem to contradict the above assessments of
private law. See infra Part IV.
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physical fact or abstract thought."28 When considering law in general,
[t]he relevant feature of law in general is that there is a symbiosis
between law and its subject matter. That is, there is a natural, almost
organic, relationship between law and what law is about ... [t]he
ordinary symbiosis that exists between law and its subject matter is
absent from the foundations of income tax law. 29
According to this analysis, there is little room for interpreting tax
statutes in a way that encompasses a more substantive, purposeful, and
economic manner that seeks a direct reading of socio-economic relations.
Consequently, tax laws should be interpreted both strictly and
formalistically-grounded in the state law interpretation and
characterization of social acts.
Certainly, private law interpretation exists as part of the fundamental
ideas and conceptions underlying the legal institution of tax law. Law, in
general, explains, guides, and regulates socio-economic intercourse.
Private law is an essential condition for social existence.
However, this analytical approach divorces the study of tax law from
the point of view of civil society. It assumes that tax law exists and can be
analyzed apart from its material basis. Tax law is treated as a closed
system, and a search for knowledge proceeds through analytical reasoning
working entirely within the private law framework. Analytical thought
creates a cognitive structure of the legal system or legal method that is
independent of actual social conditions. It exists only in the realm of
thought. If analytical reasoning exists only in the realm of abstraction, it
is divorced from the real-world subject matter of law and frustrates the
practical purpose of legal phenomenon, which is to recognize and
manipulate real human activity. Where the practical is ignored, tax law
fails to bridge the gap between abstract categories and material conditions.
However, if tax law's categories only weakly (or not at all) grasp
socio-economic conditions, tax law will have little or no normative
power.30 Since observation tells us that income tax law is enormously
successful, it must, in the main, assess the realities of modern socio-
28. See John Prebble, Philosophical and Design Problems that Arise from the Ectopic Nature of
Income Tax Law and Their Impact on the Taxation ofInternational Trade and Investment, 13 CHINESE
(TAIWAN) Y.B. INT'L L. & AFF. 111, 114-15 (1995).
29. Id. at 113.
30. An example is the allowance of deductions for taxpayers of "all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business." I.R.C. § 162(a)
(2014). The Internal Revenue Code ("Code") allows deductions which are relevant to tax liability
because they are subtracted from gross income to determine the taxable base under I.R.C. § 63(a)
(2014), interpreted generally as appropriate and useful expenses related to business activities.
Ordinarily, though these concepts require interpretation of what an expense is (a payment) and what is
a trade or business, taxpayers have little difficulty in knowing what is in fact deductible under this
section in the ordinary case. See, e.g., Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1933)
(interpretation of the ordinary and necessary requirement). Deductibility also requires consideration of
the capitalization requirement under I.R.C. § 263(a) (2014). See, e.g., Indopco, Inc. V. Comm'r, 503
U.S. 79, 84-88 (1992) (interpretation of the capitalization requirement).
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economic life. Indeed, the reality of the modem income tax is that its
influence on human behavior is immense and that it is as much a part of
civil existence as the relations of work, production, and consumption. The
penetrating statement hat there is no such thing as a pretax world captures
the critical relationship between income taxation and today's society.
III. A DIFFERENT ROLE FOR PRIVATE LAW IN INTERPRETATION
The thesis of this paper is that tax law's grasp of taxpayers' affairs
should not be limited by the point of view of private law. It starts by
disputing the view that the concepts of taxation are analytical abstractions
without a concrete basis that can only be given content by private law
categories. This point will be demonstrated by showing how U.S. tax law
has in many cases broken away from an assessment of the tax facts on the
basis of private law.31 The result is that a more nuanced approach to
taxpayer activities is embedded in U.S. tax interpretation. The importance
of the American approach will be illuminated by comparing it to the quite
different approaches of other nations.
A. Determining the Scope of Tax Terms That Have Significant Private
Law Meaning
The two central notions of income taxation are income and
deductions. The idea of income often depends upon the kind of tax system
the country has adopted: schedular or global. The United Kingdom
presents the best example of an analytical schedular income tax,32 which
separates income into its constituent parts, taxing each part separately. In
schedular systems, there is no need for a comprehensive concept of
income, since each schedule often uses different terms to define its tax
base.
The United States adopted a synthetic or global income tax system.33
Global systems begin with a holistic approach to income; income is
treated the same no matter its kind or source.34 A global concept of
income does present a difficult task. Its notion is to present as a unity
many different aspects of socio-economic relations. Like concepts in
general, the concept of income must capture the critical essences of
different happenings on the basis of the concept's objective. The process
must take us from the most specific, that is that which sets phenomena
31. See infra Part IV.
32. See William B. Barker, A Comparative Approach to Income Tax Law in the United Kingdom






apart, to the most general, that which makes them similar.
The global and the schedular contrast in the case of the United States
and the United Kingdom demonstrates the form-substance problem. Take,
for example, the heart of any income tax system, the tax treatment of
labor. Labor, which is the most basic human productive activity, is the
largest component of the tax base.35 In the United Kingdom, Schedule E
charges an employee on "emoluments" of an office or employment.36 The
United Kingdom courts require a direct link between the payment and
services rendered.37 However, this link must be supported by legal
requirements. Consequently, in many cases where payments were made to
an employee by employers and others clearly in connection with the
employee providing services, the payments were considered as something
other than emoluments of employment based on strict legal interpretation
of the employment relation.38 The consequence is that income that cannot
be included as an emolument is not taxed.
In the United States, in contrast, income is not limited to particular
sources.39 Instead income includes gain in all its forms.40 This has in
many cases eliminated requirements that income in the employment
setting satisfies certain private law requirements of compensation.41
Income tax law's subject is the socio-economic base of production,
distribution, and consumption. Key elements to our understanding of this
complex system are money, capital, and value. Central to our
understanding of the dynamic movement of goods, services, money, and
capital in the creation of value is the notion of exchange. Income's role is
to pierce these relations in order to capture the value created in a society.
This value is as real to those in civil society as the means used to acquire
such value. Those items included in the concept of income are
conceptually derived from an economic understanding.
In other words, why should the point of view of private law be given
an absolutely privileged status as compared with the point of view of
economics? Reason confirms that limiting tax concepts to an examination
of private law form can often distort tax law's assessment of material
conditions. This distorted outcome should be expected due to the
difference in objectives of the private law and the tax law.
Private law's principle purpose is to facilitate and sanction the
35. See JONATHAN BERRY FORMAN, MAKING AMERICA WORK 6,292 n.13 (2006).
36. Income and Corporations Tax Act 1988, c. 1, § 19, sch. E (Eng.).
37. See Hochstrasser v. Mayes [1960] AC 376, 388.
38. Id.; see also Pritchard v. Arundale [1971] 1 Ch. 229; Moore v. Griffiths, [1972] 1 W.L.R.
1024 (Ch.).
39. See Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426, 428 (1955).
40. See Barker, supra note 32, at 25.
41. See Hornung v. Comm'r, 47 T.C. 428 (1967) (football player includes in income car
transferred from non-employer as a prize or award).
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existing economic and social relations that are normal.4 2 People are
concerned with the private law characterization of a particular transaction
only when it is of importance to establishing or vindicating the rights of
the private parties involved.
People pay particular attention to the parties' characterization
because the choice of juridical form is within the parties' range of choice,
and our assumption is that the parties voluntarily and knowingly willed the
legal consequences of the form. In this way, the law provides the
foundation upon which commerce is carried out, and its purpose to
facilitate this commerce is achieved. Private law views material
conditions from the perspective of private interest, which is only one
perspective among many.
However, tax law's purpose is not to uphold the validity of socio-
economic intercourse, but to determine its significance in the state-
mandated assessment of tax liability. The object is the vindication of
statutory policies that are the foundation of our free society. In setting out
the procedure for determining tax liability, the legislature provides
categories to analyze the taxpayer's activities and provides instructions for
determining the tax liability. The relevant question is whether Congress
means the private law understanding of the terms it uses, or instead means
another understanding that in some cases may be at odds with private law.
This alternative requires the tax concepts to reflect the actual material
conditions of the transaction.
Tax law has developed defenses where taxpayers use legal form in a
way that does not reflect actual legal rights and obligations.43 Though
private law usually assesses human activity in an appropriate way from the
perspective of the reasons behind private law, this is not always the case.
Where the taxpayer does not intend the legal consequences of the legal
form she has chosen, tax systems have doctrines like sham, simulation,
and abuse of law which change the legal characterization of the taxpayer's
acts for tax purposes." A sham transaction is one where the "acts done
were intended to give the appearance of creating legal rights different
from those actually created."45 Courts often state that it is not the label
the taxpayer has chosen, but the true legal character of the facts of the
transaction entered into that is determinative for tax purposes.46 These
analogous doctrines abandon formalism but replace it with a strict and
complete legalism that redefines the potential contradiction between form
42. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 9.
43. See infra Part IV.
44. Sham is an American and Commonwealth doctrine. Simulation and Abuse of Law are civil
law doctrines. Each doctrine requires the recharacterization of the transaction where it is found that
the taxpayer did not intend the legal consequences of the private law form.
45. Snook v. London and W. Riding Invs., Ltd., [1967] 1 All ER 518, 520 (Eng.).
46. See IRC v. Mallaby-Deeley, [1938] 4 All ER 818, 825 (Eng.).
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and substance with the more erudite distinction between legal form and
legal substance.
Legalism depends on the objective assessment of legal facts and not
on the subjective objectives of the taxpayers. A leading English case
demonstrates the importance of the dogmatic attention to a legal
construction of a taxpayer's acts. In IRC v. Westminster,47 the House of
Lords sought the proper characterization of the following circumstances.
The Duke of Westminster had contractually obligated himself to pay an
employee a sum of £1.90 per week for seven years whether or not the
employee remained the Duke's employee.48 The Duke explained to the
employee that even though he was already entitled to £3.00 a week for his
services, the Duke expected him to take only the difference of E1.10 per
week.49 The legal form of the contract for £1.90 was that of an annuity
that was income to the employee and deductible by the Duke under the
general principles of English tax law.50 Wages, under U.K. tax law, while
still taxable to the employee, were not deductible by the Duke because
they were not related to a profitmaking activity under any of the
schedules.51
Though the House of Lords considered all the factors, including the
Duke's letter to his employee stating his expectation as to the employee's
demand of only the net wages, the court's decision rested on what it called
the "true legal construction of the transaction."52 Because the Duke was
legally bound to pay the "annuity" even if the employee did not work, the
transaction was an annuity, not compensation for services.53  The
transaction was not a sham because, even though t e Duke's intention may
have been to pay wages in the form of an annuity, and even though that is
exactly what transpired, by binding himself to the contract, the Duke's
legal intent coincided with the legal form of the contract. In this case,
form was a true manifestation of legal substance, which is the only
relevant reality for taxation. Tax law's scope depends on the genuine
legal intent of the actors.54
One must acknowledge that private law is part of the actual material
conditions of human activity. In private law, we characterize what people
do with the categories of private law from the vantage point of private law.
This vantage point has its limitations, however. Tax laws should also
47. [1936] AC 1, 19 T.C. 490 (Eng.).
48. Id. at 497.
49. Id. at 498.
50. Id. at 502.
51. See JoHN TILEY, BUTrERWORTHS U.K. TAX GUIDE, 1988-89, at 4 (7th ed.).
52. Westminster, AC 1, 19 T.C. at 508.
53. Id.
54. See Front Simco v. M.N.R., [1960] C.T.C. 123 (Eng.) (sham is where the legal effect is
different from the form).
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characterize what people do from other perspectiVes because it views
human activity with a different purpose and seeks a different kind of
knowledge.55 This different grasp of socio-economic conditions should
more directly capture their significance for tax purposes.
To see this, one should ask, why does the legislature differentiate
between types of transactions and provide different tax consequences?
There are two general answers. The first is that in some cases the
legislature intends that use of particular legal forms will result in tax-
advantaged or tax-disadvantaged results. The second is that the legislature
recognizes that certain differences in the taxpayer's position warrant
different results. However, these considerations do not lead to the
conclusion that legal form controls tax outcome or that legal form is the
only way to capture the essential differences and similarities that
legislatively require different tax results.
While tax is law and legislatures are lawmakers, not all lawmakers
are trained in law. It is difficult to presume that formal legal distinctions
are the only meaning the lawmakers had in mind, even in nations where
the same legislative body is responsible for both tax law and private law.
Legislatures include individuals who bring common experience,
knowledge, and non-legal models to drafting. Since legislators are not all
experts in all the nuances of legal knowledge, interpretation of tax statutes
should be freed from the requirement of private law dominance.
However, this freedom in interpretation is formally conferred on those
who are trained in the law. It should not be surprising that those trained in
the law who are charged with carrying out the legislative will would
assume tax meaning coincides with legal form or private law meaning.
These interpreters are the tax professionals who include the judges,
administrators, private counsels and scholars.56  It is this group that
remains uncomfortable with a scheme that includes points of view of the
facts different than that of the private law.
However, this group misses the importance of tax law's relation to
taxpayers who must initially interpret tax law by applying its commands to
their individual circumstances. In many cases, tax law should be
interpreted as being directly aimed at people's experiences. Thus, the
characterization of socio-economic conditions by legal form is not the
only way.
Tax law often relies on certain characteristics of the taxpayer's affairs
that evidence a difference in position that warrants a difference in tax
liability. In some cases, the legal consequences of legal form have
55. See infra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
56. See Barker, supra note 5, at 723; see also Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic
Approach to Comparative Law I, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 22 (1991).
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economic consequences that can be the basis for different tax treatment.57
In other words, legal characterization is often in sync with economic
characterization. It is not the legal differences per se, however, that are
usually the legislator's reasons for different tax treatment, but instead the
economic differences. That is the key. Though it is practical in many
instances to use private law characterization as tax law meaning, tax
concepts are designed to capture relevant economic consequences.
Therefore, tax concepts should always be understood in terms of real
economic effects unless the statute indicates exclusive reliance on legal
form. In many cases, legal form is used to achieve fairly well-understood
economic effects.5 8 In these cases, it is practical to rely on legal form as a
substitute for an analysis of actual economic effects. Where legal form
fails to capture economic conditions, it should not be followed for tax
purposes. Legal implications can have certain economic consequences
that legislation has targeted for specific tax treatment. Where those legal
consequences lack economic relevancy, it should not be presumed that the
legislature had them in mind, and they should be ignored.
Though the dominance of legal form is taken for granted in most
countries including the United States,59 the actual experience in the United
States is quite different from the result of the rest of the world and
indicates a substantial deviation from this view. The actual process of
interpretation in many contexts actually follows the suggested reasoning
outlined above. One uniquely American reason for this is that in the
United States the legal effects of transactions are practically always
determined by the private law of the states, rather than that of the federal
government. This fact has exerted a unique pressure on U.S. tax
jurisprudence. The result has been that U.S. tax law does not exclusively
follow state law determinations.
Sometimes in America the statute explicitly provides that the tax law
is based on the rights and liabilities provided under state law. Examples
include the definition of community income in Section 66(d)(2) 60 and the
prohibition of the deduction of any illegal bribe, etc., "under any law of a
state (but only if such State law is generally enforced)."61 In many cases
under estate and gift tax law, tax liability is made explicitly dependent on
57. For example, a contract for the lease of property usually reflects the economic exchange of
consideration for the use of property and is taxed differently than a contract for the sale of property,
which usually reflects the economic exchange of consideration for the ownership of property. In the
case of leased payments, the tenant receives a deduction for the expenditure if incurred in a profit-
making activity. I.R.C. § 162 (2012). Whereas in the case of a sale the purchaser must capitalize her
expenditure. Id. § 263 (2012).
58. See Barker, supra note 5, at 723; see also Sacco, supra note 56, at 22.
59. See BITTKER & MCMAHON, supra note 12, at 1-17.
60. I.R.C. § 66(d)(2) (2012).
61. Id. § 162(c)(2) (2012).
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the nature of property rights defined under state law.62 Even where
federal tax liability turns upon the character of a property interest held
under state law, however, "federal authorities are not bound by the
determination made of such property interest by a state trial court." 63
Here, the federal interest in getting the tax correct prevails over
adjudicated private law property rights.
Other times the tax statute adopts explicitly federal standards. The
definition of alimony under Section 71 provides a federal standard that
makes any inconsistent state definition irrelevant.64 Section 642, in fact,
uses the word disability in two different fashions, one in terms of a legal
disability to alter the terms of a trust under state law,65 and in another
context to define a disability trust as one where the beneficiary has a
disability under federal social security law.66 In other cases, like the case
of marriage, state law determinations are modified in order to accomplish
a federal tax purpose.67 Instances of explicit statutory adoption of either a
national legal standard in opposition to either the state law standard or a
state private law standard are rare, however. In the majority of cases, tax
statutes do not explicitly adopt one position or another.68
This large grey area has left to the courts and the administration
significant discretion in the development of the content of the tax law in
America.69 It has forced American courts to confront traditional thinking
on the role of private law where an obvious goal of national tax law is
uniformity in treatment.70 In speaking of Congress' power to tax, the U.S.
Supreme Court stated:
The exertion of that power is not subject to state control. It is the will
of Congress which controls . .. in the absence of language evidencing a
different purpose, is to be interpreted so as to give a uniform application
to a nationwide scheme of taxation. State law may control only when
the federal taxing act, by express language or necessary implication,
62. See, e.g., United States v. Pierce, 137 F.2d 428, 431-32 (8th Cir. 1943) (tax on the grantor of
a trust was dependent on whether the grantor had a power to revoke the trust, a clearly legal right).
63. Comm'r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 457 (1967).
64. I.R.C. § 71 (2012).
65. Id. § 642(c)(2).
66. Id. § 642(b)(2)(C)(ii).
67. Id. § 7703(b) (certain individuals who are married under state law are not considered to be
married for federal tax purposes).
68. For example, annuities are included in income without the Code offering an explicit
definition of an annuity. See id. § 61(a)(9) (annuities included in income); id. § 72 (the tax treatment
of annuities); id. § 1221 (providing that "the term 'capital asset' means property" with certain
exceptions).
69. The United Kingdom has had an analogous experience in that it confronts the problem of
four private law jurisdictions, England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, and also accepts the
proposition that the language of the statute should have uniform effect in all jurisdictions. Unlike the
United States, the doctrine is to interpret the legal terms in accordance with the law of the country to
which they belong and to apply them to the other jurisdictions by analogy. See Lord Advocate v.




makes its own operation dependent upon state law.7 1
The facts in Burnet v. Hannel72 present a pointed example of a
situation in which the Court had to consider the effect of a state
classification of an oil severance payment. In that case, the state of Texas
classified the payment as a sale of oil, rather than a lease, which was the
typical classification of the economic events in other U.S. states.73 The
Court did not simply adopt a majority rule and rely on the usual state
classifications of the facts as leases, but instead carefully considered the
different implications of a sale of oil versus a lease, both in their technical
sense and as commonly understood.74 The Court determined that for
federal tax purposes these transactions were to be treated as leases, thus
producing ordinary income, rather than sales yielding preferential capital
gains.75 The Court stated that following the particular law of Texas
"would have tended to defeat rather than further the purpose of the Act." 76
Similarly, in Heiner v. Mellon,7 7 the Court required partnership tax
principles to apply to a business entity that was classified as a trust under
Pennsylvania law.78 The federal law interpretation led to the partners
being taxed on their distributive share of the income rather than the trust
being taxed, even though under state law governing trusts, no distribution
of the income could have been made to the partners.79 The Court
determined this private law liability was irrelevant because the tax law
taxed partners on their "distributive share, whether distributed or not,"
and, presumably, taxation of the partners was appropriate regardless of
whether the income was legally allowed to be distributed currently.8 0 In a
similar holding, in Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Commissioner,81 the
court had to determine what was the correct basis of a remainder in a trust
where the Internal Revenue Code ("Code") required an adjustment to basis
for depreciation allowed or allowable. The trust had not taken a
depreciation deduction because under Pennsylvania law, it was not
allowed to.82 The court determined that he depreciation deduction and
the concomitant reduction in basis was mandatory under federal tax law
because "state law cannot be given an effect for tax purposes which
71. Bumet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932) (citations omitted), superseded by statute, I.R.C.
§ 613A (2012).
72. 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
73. Id. at 105.
74. Id. at 106-08.
75. Id. at I10-11.
76. Id. at 108.
77. 304 U.S. 271 (1938).
78. Id. at 280.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 280-81.
81. 47 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1931).
82. Id. at 38.
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conflicts with the provisions of a federal revenue law," 83 nor can state law
deprive a trustee or taxpayer of a deduction he would be entitled to, or
deprive the federal government of a tax based on those provisions.84
These and many other cases have articulated federal standards for tax
legislation contrary to state law legal rights after consideration of the
objectives of the taxing act.
The stakes can be enormous when giving tax effect to a private law
classification. In Hart v. Commissioner,85 the question was whether a
taxpayer was entitled to a deduction for interest paid where the taxpayer
had given his promissory note to the creditor for the amount due where,
under Massachusetts law, "the giving of a note for interest is a discharge
of the original obligation and a substitution therefor for a new and
different obligation."86 Though the interest had been paid according to the
law of Massachusetts,87 allowing a deduction according to this private law
understanding would have been inconsistent with a tax law understanding
of the requirement of payment under the cash method of accounting.88
Though the rights and liabilities created under private law are part of
factual circumstances of a taxpayer, Massachusetts's particular resolution
of these obligations turned out to be irrelevant in applying a national
standard for income tax accounting that created a general structure for
income reporting. 89
Uniformity as an aim is abstract, formal, and empty, however. It can
justify many different uniform results. In aiming at uniformity, American
courts have looked more carefully at the intent and purpose of the tax law,
and have often interpreted tax concepts in a more substantive, economic
manner.90 Though the result is that the American jurist interprets tax law
more substantively than jurists in other countries around the world, there is
still a tendency to accept a private law understanding of a tax law concept,
even where it promotes tax avoidance.
Although the general bias of lawyers is that the Code rarely uses legal
terms in a national uniform sense,91 there are so many instances of broad,
structural national rules that they often go unnoticed. The concept of
income is truly a national one, and there have been very few times where
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 54 F.2d 848 (1932).
86. Id. at 851.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 852.
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 221 (1961) (embezzlement proceeds included
in income even though taxpayer had no state property right to the proceeds); Comm'r v. Glenshaw
Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (noncompensatory anti-trust damages are income).
91. See BFrrKER & MCMAHON, supra note 12, at 1-19.
143
Washburn Law Journal
the courts have looked to state law for guidance.92 These principles can
be referred to as the common law of taxation. For example, income tax
excludes gifts and inheritances of property from the income of the
recipient.93 This characterization also has federal estate and gift tax
implications. In both cases of gifts and inheritances,94 the Supreme Court
has considered the exclusions in terms of private law classifications, and
in both cases the Court has determined that the terms have a national
meaning different from the normal common law meaning.
In Commissioner v. Duberstein,95 the Court first considered the term
"gift" on the basis of general common law legal principles (shared
principles of the various states).96 The Court concluded that the statute
did not "use the term 'gift' in the common-law sense,"97 and that a certain
transfer, "though a common-law gift, is not necessarily a 'gift' within the
meaning of the statute."98 This led to the Court adopting a uniform
national approach.
The Court, however, completely rejected a legalistic approach,
whether one based on state law and rights or one based on a legalistic
federal composite of those understandings. The Court considered the
practical nature of the tax concept and the required approach to the social
setting within which the concept must operate. The Court stated:
Decision ... must be based ultimately on the application of
the .. . experience with the mainsprings of human conduct to the totality
of the facts of each case. The nontechnical nature of the statutory
standard, the close relationship of it to the data of practical human
experience, and the multiplicity of relevant factual elements, with their
various combinations, creating the necessity of ascribing the proper
force to each, confirm us in our conclusion that primar weight in this
area must be given to the conclusions of the trier of fact.9
In some rare cases, the courts adopt sophisticated economic analysis
in place of private law characterization. For example, many courts
confronted the question of whether "insurance"10 0 premiums paid to its
wholly owned captive insurance company, either directly, or indirectly
through an unrelated insurance company, were deductible premiums for
federal tax purposes.0 1 According to the decisions of several courts, the
92. Id.
93. I.R.C. § 102 (2012).
94. See Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 193 (1938) (inheritance).
95. 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
96. Id. at 285.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 289 (emphasis added).
100. 26 U.S.C. § 162 (2012) allows a deduction for all ordinary and necessary expenses incurred
in a trade or business. 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-1(a) (2017) provides that "[almong the items included in
business expenses are . .. insurance premiums against fire, storm, theft, accident or other similar
losses in the case of a business."
101. See generally William B. Barker, Federal Income Taxation and Captive Insurance, 6 VA.
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answer was no. 102
In these cases, the taxpayer's principal argument followed the typical
formal, legalistic interpretation of tax terms. Tax law provides taxpayers
with a deduction for insurance premiums. The arrangements between
parents and subsidiaries met all of the requirements of insurance contracts
under private law. The insuring companies were duly incorporated
insurance companies under private law. In fact, in many cases, the
transactions took the form of a primary insurance contract with an
unrelated entity (AIG having been a popular choice), with the primary
insurer having reinsured most of the risks with the insured's captive
insurance company. There was never a doubt that these policies were
fully accepted as insurance for state law purposes; nor did the government
ever try to contest these legal facts. 103
Instead, the government argued that the notion of insurance for
federal income tax purposes depended on the satisfaction of certain
economic principles of insurance. Insurance was a product evidenced by
risk transfer and risk distribution.104 Risk transfer is the transfer of the
financial consequences of the insured loss from the insured to the insurer.
On the basis of the fundamental economic reality of the transaction,
insuring with one's subsidiary does not transfer the risk. This is because
the owner-insured does not truly rid itself of the financial outcome of the
losses. Whatever the financial consequences, the corporation bears them
through its ownership stake in the captive. The corporation has not truly
parted with the premium, nor with the financial consequences of the risks;
the true insured, however, has parted with both. Hence, these cases
demonstrate how tax law's concepts can overcome legal form for a highly
substantive economic analysis of social relations.
Tax legislation's object is to provide standards to assess taxpayers'
activities for appropriate taxation. To do this, tax law must fit taxpayers'
activities into a conceptual framework. Tax law's conceptual framework
is an abstraction of human activity. But invariably tax law's meaning is
seen by the jurist in terms of the abstractions of the private law which can
be a substantial step removed from material conditions. As the cases have
shown, tax avoidance depends upon the assumption that private law
reflects the reality that tax legislation aims at. There is little doubt that in
TAX REv. 267 (1986) (comprehensive treatment of captive insurance).
102. See, e.g., Avrahami v. Comm'r, Nos. 17594-13, 18274-13, 2017 WL 3610601, at *16 (T.C.
Aug. 21, 2017) (denying a deduction for a premium paid to taxpayer's captive insurance company).
103. Where the decision is that the premiums are not deductible for federal income tax purposes,
the government consistently applies that determination for other tax purposes. For example, the Code
imposes an excise tax of four percent on insurance and one percent on reinsurance premiums paid to a
foreign insurer for property liability insurance. I.R.C. § 4371 (2012). In a Private Letter Ruling, the
Internal Revenue Service concluded that this excise tax is not applicable where a captive arrangement
does not create insurance. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7,904,047 (Oct. 25, 1978).
104. Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 555, 564 (1985).
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most cases for most taxpayers, private law accurately reflects the real
material conditions of the taxpayer. In some cases, however, private law
fails to reflect those conditions. To deal with avoidance in these cases, the
statutory concepts must have a direct, unmediated connection with
economic and social conditions.
This requires a sensitivity to the goals of private law characterizations
and those of tax characterizations. The purpose of contract law, for
example, is to help the parties create their own rights and obligations by
agreement.10 5 A sale is an important concept of private law where
property and its title are transferred between a buyer and seller for
consideration. Taxation also attributes to sales tax consequences based
upon the parties' agreement as to rights and duties. The normal tax
understanding is clearly in accordance with the private law contractual
understanding of the transaction. However, in several well-defined areas
of the tax law, interpretation of the tax law concludes that the private law
created rights and obligations do not adequately reflect the actual
economic conditions. For example, where one family member "sells"
property to another at a bargain or discounted price, the tax law requires
that the transaction be recharacterized as in part a sale and in part a gift
and taxed in accordance with these realities.106 Contract law, however,
would describe this transaction as a sale in accordance with the parties'
description.
When an employee buys property from his employer, however, the
contractual understanding of sale for a stated consideration is disregarded
for tax purposes for a more nuanced economic understanding of the
exchange as including elements of compensation for payl07 that are
simply not reflected in the terms of the private law arrangement. As stated
above, when a family member "sells" property to a relative, the tax law
must make a determination of whether the sale was at a price less than the
property's fair market value. If that is the case, a private law
characterization as a sale for a stated consideration is disregarded for a
more realistic assessment that the exchange was in fact in part a sale for
the stated consideration and in part a gift of the difference in the fair
market value of the property and the sale price.108 An analogous third
area is that of a settlement of a debt. There, the satisfaction of a debt for
consideration will be examined from an economic point of view to
determine whether the debtor fully paid the creditor, or whether the debt
105. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 9, at 413.
106. See 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.1001-1(e), 1.1015-4(a)(1) (2017).
107. See Comm'r v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 247 (1955). These principles were codified. I.R.C.
§ 83 (codifying that a taxpayer receiving property in connection with the performance of services
includes the difference between the fair market value and the purchase price in income).
108. See 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.1001-1(e), 1.1015-4(a)(1). This also applies in the case ofa part gift, part
sale to a charity.
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was partially paid and partially forgiven by the creditor.109 Where a debt
was partially forgiven, the debt was not paid to that extent,110 and that
amount is gross income to the debtor subject to the possibility of a special
exclusion.'11 Each of these exceptions requires taxation in accordance
with a true economic understanding of the socio-economic relations,
which overcomes dogmatic reliance on legal form.
B. Tax Concepts and Principles Perceived Through the Lens ofPrivate
Law
The previous section's analysis considered those terms of taxation
that had significant private law meaning. There, the general interpretive
view was that the legislation must have had the private law meaning in
consideration when it adopted the same term for tax incidence. It was
shown that reliance on private law meaning for tax purposes sometimes
leads to an ineffective tax assessment, which becomes more effective
using a more direct assessment of socio-economic conditions. Oftentimes,
however, tax law uses terms that are not readily translated into private law
categories. In such cases, private law can still play a dominating role in
providing the framework for tax law's approach to economic and social
relations. This section examines how private law rights and obligations
mediate tax law meanings.
The challenge to income tax is that income tax and the economic
conditions it seeks to harness are reciprocal elements in a complex, and
sometimes contradictory, interaction. In contrast, other taxes like sales
taxes have the relatively simple focus on one stage of our economy and
require the identification of: the parties to a consumer sale; the value of
the commodity, which is readily identified by the contract; and the rate,
which is supplied by statute. Income taxation, however, deals with every
stage of our complex system of production, distribution, and consumption.
In accomplishing its task, tax molds and defines notions like labor, capital,
and value for both itself and as an essential aspect of socio-economic
conditions. The consequence is thatfew aspects of social life are free from
income tax's incidence or influence. The common expression that there is
no such thing as a pre-tax world is an affirmation that income tax is as
much a part of civil existence as work, production, and consumption.
Words like income, deduction, or realization perform a central role in
income tax law, whereas they have little significance in private law. The
109. See Preslar v. Comm'r, 167 F.3d 1323, 1330 (10th Cir. 1999) (substantive approach); cf
Zarin v. Comm'r, 916 F.2d 110, 113 (3d Cir. 1990) (formal, private law approach).
110. Preslar, 167 F.3d at 1330; Zarin, 916 F.2d at 112-13.
111. See I.R.C. § 61 (2012) (forgiveness of indebtedness is income); I.R.C. § 108 (2012) (certain
debt forgiveness is not included in income).
147
Washburn Law Journal
concepts of income and deduction are abstractions of socio-economic
conditions that represent a unity of approach to many different aspects of
material conditions tied together on the basis of certain essences. Without
legal antecedents, these concepts in the tax law are abstractions of material
economic and social conditions that are meant to describe those conditions
from the point of view of the needs and policies of taxation. The
government is not a party to the exchanges occurring, and its purpose in
classifying transactions in certain ways is the result of national tax
rationales and policies that may not reflect private law rights and
obligations.
To what extent should the tax law's interpretation of socio-economic
conditions be understood only in terms of the legal rights and obligations
of the socio-economic relations? These rights should have significance if
the legal right reflects an aspect of the conditions that provides an
assessment that is relevant to the tax law's purpose. Where the legal right
lacks this relevancy, it should not control.
The U.S. Supreme Court examined the relevancy of private rights in
a series of cases that dealt with the reach of the concept of income in
determining taxability of extorted and embezzled amounts by taxpayers.
In Commissioner v. Wilcox,112 the Supreme Court was presented with the
problem of whether an embezzler must include his wrongful
appropriations in his gross income.113 It was not many years before that
the Supreme Court had stressed that income meant economic gain, and
that "[c]ommon understanding and experience are the touchstones for the
interpretation of the revenue laws."114 Yet the Court in Wilcox decided
that an embezzler did not have income because he had received the money
without a colorable legal claim.115 Because an embezzler has absolutely
no legal rights to the funds, the Court reasoned that he had no income.116
The result was that the legal characterization of his control over the money
prevented the embezzler from having economic gain.117
This reliance on legal rights was followed by the Supreme Court in
the case of an extortionist, but the Court reached a different result. In
Rutkin v. United States,1 18 the Court distinguished the extortionist from
the embezzler in Wilcox on the basis of common law property
principles.1 19 While the embezzler has no property interest in embezzled
funds because his victim is ignorant of the wrongful taking, an extortionist
112. 327 U.S. 404 (1946).
113. Id. at 405.
114. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 119 (1940).
115. Wilcox, 327 U.S. at 409.
116. Id. at 405.
117. Id. at 408-09.
118. 343 U.S. 130 (1952).
119. See id. at 138.
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has a voidable property interest in the proceeds of the illegal act because
his victim is an active party to the transfer of the money.120
Though the two decisions stress legal consequences, their views are
contradictory. Wilcox stressed the absolute legal requirement to repay the
money, which was also the case in Rutkin. Rutkin, however, stressed
different legal rights, finding that the extortionist did have a certain legal
right to the funds.121 These technical legal niceties, though accurate
private law distinctions, may have been relevant to determine the rights of
third parties, but had little to do with a tax laws purpose to tax income.
Indeed, Rutkin stressed a more economic approach to income where the
Court stressed that money "constitutes taxable income when its recipient
has such control over it that, as a practical matter, he derives readily
realizable economic value from it." 122 This economic approach provides a
more rational basis for the result than that of the private law rationale.
Shortly after Rutkin, the Court confronted the case of an embezzler a
second time in James v. United States.123 Putting to rest the confusion
surrounding Wilcox and Rutkin,124 the Court refused to have the tax
outcome controlled by private law technicalities.125  Stressing the
economic view in Rutkin, the Court ruled that a person was to be taxed on
"realizable economic value," and the embezzler had such gain despite the
fact that he lacked legal rights to the money. 126
James was decided just after the Court had decided Commissioner v.
Glenshaw Glass,127 which reiterated the Court's broad approach to
income. In deciding James, the Court cited Glenshaw Glass explaining
income has been held to encompass "all 'accessions to wealth, clearly
realized, and over which the taxpayer[] [has] complete dominion."'128
Thus, under James, the interpretation of the concept of income that is
satisfied by the factors of accessions to wealth and of dominion or control
over the thing that constitutes the gain would not in all cases be limited by
private law implications. Hence forward, these guides to interpretation
would be utilized in assessing socio-economic relations in a direct manner
based upon other non-legal perspectives, including practical reason and
economics.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 135-36.
122. Id. at 137.
123. 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
124. Id. at 215, 221.
125. Id. at 216. Referring to the legal distinction between extortion and embezzlement, he Court
stated that "[q]uestions of federal income taxation are not determined by such 'attenuated subtleties."'
Id. (quoting Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114 (1930)).
126. Id. at 219.
127. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
128. James, 366 U.S. at 219 (quoting Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 431).
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IV. THE LIMITATIONS ON THE RELIANCE ON FORMAL LEGAL METHOD
FOR TAX LAW: SIMULATION, SHAM, SUBSTANCE OVER FORM, AND ABUSE
OF LAW
It is not an exaggeration to remark that the universal starting point for
the interpretation of an application of tax legislation is the private law
consequences of the social acts of the taxpayer. The legal method of the
tax professional takes as a given that the meaning of the categories of tax
law is based on the significant legal rights and obligations created by
private law, particularly in the area of contract, property, family law, and
trusts and estates. Consequently, tax law's incidence depends on the free
choice of private persons to structure their transactions and relationships
with other private parties in any way the private law permits. This may
lead taxpayers to use a particular legal form to achieve tax results that
appear at odds with what would appear to be the normal tax outcome of
the taxpayer's objective.
Throughout the world, tax law has developed similar approaches
where taxpayers use legal form in a way that does not reflect the actual
legal consequence intended by the parties. Where the taxpayer does not
intend the legal consequences of the legal form she has chosen, tax
systems have doctrines like simulation and sham. 129 In general, these
doctrines change the tax consequences from that which would result from
the pure formalistic expression of the taxpayer's intent to that which
results from the taxation of the true legal consequences intended by the
taxpayer.
A. Simulation and Sham
The civil law doctrine of simulation permits the government to
contest tax law's reliance on the civil law form of the transaction by
submitting evidence showing the "real nature" of the transaction in order
to have the transaction recharacterized in accordance with its real
nature.130 The real nature, however, refers to the real legal meaning of the
transaction, and not a contrasting economic meaning.131 The doctrine
compares the legal rights and obligations of the legal form with the
taxpayer's legally intended outcome. It is the latter that forms the basis
for the tax outcome.132  The doctrine only applies where the legal
instruments are not intended to have their actual legal effect.133
129. See infra Part IV.A.
130. See Vanistendael, supra note 17, at 135.
131. VICTOR THURONYI, COMPARATIVE TAx LAW 157 (Wolters Kluwer ed., 2004).
132. Id.
133. Id. The doctrine can also be found in the Netherlands. See Kees van Raad, The Netherlands,
in cOMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION 99 (Wolters Kluwer ed., 2004).
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Similarly, those systems founded on the common law have adopted
an analogous approach based on the notion of sham. The United
Kingdom, like the United States, rejects taxation based on legal labels and
instead seeks the true legal character of the transaction entered into.134
The notion of sham does more than simply reject the discontinuity
between legal labels and legal form. Like the doctrine of simulation,
United Kingdom courts follow the doctrine that where the "acts done were
intended to give the appearance of creating legal rights different from
those actually created,"'35 the law follows the true legal intent of the
parties.136
In the United States, the doctrine of sham is part of the overall
approach of form and substance, so its parameters as a separate doctrine
are not well-defined.137 Where the key to tax incidence is the legal
relationship between parties, American courts often go "behind the written
contract in order to discover the true facts."138 Courts generally express
the view that taxation must be in accord with that which the taxpayer has
actually done. This is sometimes referred to as sham in fact. It has as its
basis a finding that the legal facts embodied in the legal form chosen by
the parties did not actually happen,139 or that the parties intended an
outcome different from that found in the legal documents. Courts tax in
accordance with what the taxpayer actually did, not in accordance with the
legal rights and obligations set forth in the documents.
The courts' determinations expose a contradiction between the formal
intent of the parties expressed in the contract and the true facts, reality, or
substance of what the parties actually intended. In Knetsch v. United
States,140 the Court questioned whether there was in reality a "true
obligation to pay interest" where the documents clearly set out a debtor-
creditor undertaking, and whether an annuity contract was a "fiction."1 41
The discovery of "reality" requires the fact finder to go outside the four
corners of the written contract by placing the undertaking in a broader
context.
Extrinsic evidence that leads to a conclusion as to the parties' true
intentions negates the formal intentions of the written documents. One
134. IRC v. Mallaby-Deeley, [1938] All ER 818 at 825 (Eng). See BITKER & MCMAHON, supra
note 12, at 1-20 (noting that legal labels are also not conclusive in the United States).
135. Snook v. London and W. Riding Invs., Ltd., [1967] 1 All ER 518, 520 (Eng.); see also
Cambell Discount, Ltd. v. Bridge [1962] All ER 385, 402 (Eng.).
136. See Stubart Investments Ltd. v. The Queen, [1984] CTC 294, 84 DTC 6305 (Can.) (outlining
Canadian approach).
137. See generally Walter J. Blum, Knetsch v. United States: A Pronouncement on Tax
Avoidance, 1961 SUP. CT. REv. 135, 157 n. 73 (1961) (for a classification of sham transactions); see
also GEORGE K. YIN & KAREN C. BURKE, CORPORATE TAXATION 118 (2011).
138. Stem v. Comm'r, 137 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1943).
139. See YIN AND BURKE, supra note 137, at 118.
140. 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
141. Id. at 366-67.
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way of looking at this is that a social or economic perspective supplants a
legal perspective for tax purposes. A second assessment is that, like in the
case of simulation or United Kingdom sham, the true facts are simply the
true legal facts upon which tax liability depends, and that private law
characterization still prevails for taxation. This is the best explanation for
the doctrine that legal labels are not determinative for tax purposes.14 2
The second assessment can be illustrated by the facts of In re Starr v.
Commissioner.143  In that case, the taxpayer had contracted for the
installation of a sprinkler system. 144 The agreement was in the form of a
lease that called for rent payments for the first five years of $1240 per
year, and at the option of the lessee, an additional five years at $32 per
year.145 No provisions for renewal were made after ten years, except that
if the lessee did not renew, the lessor had a period of six months to remove
the system from the premises.146
The lessee deducted the yearly rental payments in accordance with
the tax law's treatment of lease payments.147  The Commissioner,
however, contended that the transaction was in substance a sale, which
would make the payments nondeductible capital costs.148 The court
agreed with the Commissioner.149 Though the written contract was for a
lease of a sprinkler system with the installer retaining ownership, the court
concluded that the "practical realities" of this arrangement was to pass title
eventually to the "lessee."150  This was established, inferentially, by
extrinsic evidence to the effect that the removal by the "lessor" was
improbable due to the large cost of removal and the negligible salvage
value of the system.'5 ' There was also evidence that, in every other case
of similar leases, the installer had never removed the sprinkler system.152
Since the court concluded that it would stretch credibility that the "lessor"
would ever remove the system, the parties must have intended the transfer
of ownership.153 Thus, this legal consequence of the parties' undertaking
resulted in a sale.
Is taxation in accordance with the "practical realities" an example of
an economic understanding of the facts substituting for a legal one, or is it
taxation in accordance with a true assessment of the legal facts
142. See THURONYI, supra notes 131-132 and accompanying text.
143. 274 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1959).





149. In re Starr, 274 F.2d at 297.
150. Id. at 295.
151. Id.
152. In re Starr v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 856, 862 (1958), rev'd, 274 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1959).
153. In re Starr, 274 F.2d at 296.
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substituting for a false one? The latter, which stresses contract
interpretation, fits the process by which the Starr's Estate court found the
practical nature of the arrangement and reached its conclusion as to what
the parties really intended. In a contract dispute arising in state court,
either party might argue that the agreement was different from its written
expression. In order to demonstrate this, a party would have to submit
evidence extrinsic to the written document to support her construction of
the contract. In contract law, this is the domain of the parol evidence rule
that sometimes prevents the introduction of this evidence.154 Indeed, the
Starr's Estate court acknowledged that a state court might follow the kind
of label the parties gave the transaction.155 Because the parol evidence
rule only applies where the contract is unambiguous, clear, found to be an
integrated expression of the entire undertaking by the parties, the rule
might not apply here to exclude extrinsic evidence due to the ambiguity
created by the absence of a provision on renewal after ten years and the
presence of minimal rent for the second five year term.156 However, the
parol evidence rule has, in many instances, not been applied to third
parties including the federal government in tax matters.157 The policy that
it would be unfair to a party not to be able to rely on the written expression
of the agreement loses its force where the government seeks fair
taxation. 158
The focus of U.S. tax law on taxation in accordance with what the
taxpayer actually did emphasizes two different modes of interpretation:
taxation based on the true legal intent of the taxpayer, often referred to as
sham in fact,159 and taxation based on the underlying economic facts of
the taxpayer's undertaking, which can be referred to as sham in substance,
or substance over form.160 The former, like the doctrine of simulation and
the English doctrine of sham,161 is taxation in accordance with the true
legal facts of the taxpayer's activity, rather than taxation in accordance
with inaccurate legal labels or written descriptions. As such, it is a
rejection of form where the taxpayer never intended its attendant legal
154. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 9, at 416.
155. In re Starr, 274 F.2d at 294 ("While according to state law the instrument will probably be
taken (with the consequent legal incidents) by the name the parties give it. . .
156. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 9, at 416.
157. See Joseph T. Sneed, Some Reflections about the Impact of Federal Taxation on American
Private Law, 12 BuFF. L. REv. 241, 243 (1963).
158. Id.
159. See generally Nat'l Lead Co. v. Comm'r, 336 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1964) (finding that the
intercorporate sale of stock had no reality for tax purposes where the seller continued to control the
property for fifteen years after the sham sale); see also ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231, 241
n.30 (3d Cir. 1998).
160. As early as 1930, the Supreme Court "recognize[d] the importance of regarding matters of
substance and disregarding forms in applying the provisions of the ... income tax laws." United
States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 168 (1930).
161. See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text.
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consequences. Rather than a rejection of private law interpretation of the
facts, it pursues the objective of genuine legal interpretation of private law
acts, and, in so doing, it reinforces and revalidates the primacy of the
private law assessment of the taxpayers' activities in the interpretation of
tax law.
Substance over form (or sham in substance) plays a quite different
role in tax jurisprudence. 'While interpretation still begins with the private
law characterization of the facts which the court accepts as the intended
legal consequences of the taxpayer, courts chose in certain situations to tax
in accordance with a substantive, economic, or social characterization of
the facts. The result is that substance dispenses with the legal form for tax
purposes.162
However, the quantum leap from the primacy of private law to its
negation under the combined doctrines of substance over form and abuse
of law in civil law requires not only explanation, but also justification.
The first step is to recognize that private law can and does have a different
role in the assessment of the facts for tax purposes, which is neither an
exclusive nor a mistaken approach when it is inconsistent with a more
substantive tax interpretation.
B. The Contrasting Focus ofSham, Substance over Form, and Abuse of
Law: An Example
Understanding private law as the gatekeeper to the realm of fact
requires an understanding as well of the ways that courts and revenue
departments circumvent the gatekeeper. An issue that tested all of these
interpretive devices was the captive insurance issue.
An examination of captive insurance lends itself well to exploring the
relationships among private law and sham, substance over form, and abuse
of law (the civil law concept). A captive insurance company is typically a
wholly-owned insurance subsidiary whose primary function is to insure
the risks of its parent organization. 163
The IRS has in the past spent considerable ffort in challenging the
propriety of allowing a deduction to affiliate corporations for "premiums"
for "insurance" paid to captive insurance companies.164 The purpose of
this section is to illustrate the possible approaches that the Service could
use.
162. See, e.g., Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
163. See generally Barker, supra note 101.
164. See BORRIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTACE, FEDERAL INCoME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 1-22 to 1-24 (7th ed. 2016).
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1. Entity Sham
General principles of income taxation treat incorporated entities
owned by other corporations as separate taxpayers even where they
engage in transactions with related entities.165 Whatever the purpose for
the formation of the entity, "so long as that purpose is the equivalent of
business activity or is followed by the carrying on of business by the
corporation, the corporation remains a separate taxable entity."1 66 The
question of what is a corporation for federal tax purposes, however, is
determined under state law.1 67
Corporations can be disregarded as a sham where the corporation
does not engage in any activities. 168 A corporate entity is also a sham
where the owner ignores the corporation in doing business.169 In each of
these cases, the taxpayer does not intend the legal consequences of the
legal form of the business selected. However, only a low level of business
activity like following the formalities of corporate governance, borrowing,
and opening bank accounts is required to protect a corporation from sham
status.170 Because captive insurance companies engage in a range of
activities, they easily meet the formal requirements of separate corporate
entity status.171 Thus, courts have generally held that captive insurance
companies were separate corporate entities.172
2. Transactional Sham
The focus of transactional sham is on the contract of insurance, and
in particular, on its basic structure which is the payment of a premium for
insurance coverage. Transactional sham asks whether the taxpayer
intended the legal consequences of an insurance transaction, or whether
there are facts outside the four corners of the insurance contract that
demonstrates a different intent that presents the true facts upon which tax
incidence depends.173
F.R. Johnson Products Co. v. Commissioner74 illustrates such a
disparity between legal form and true intent. In that case, the taxpayer
165. See, e.g., Nat'l. Carbide Corp. v. Comm'r, 336 U.S. 422 (1949); Moline Props., Inc. v.
Comm'r, 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
166. Moline Props., 319 U.S. at 438-39.
167. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(30) (2017); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (2014) (referring to
incorporation under federal, state, or Indian tribal statutes).
168. Paymer v. Comm'r, 150 F.2d 334, 337 (2d Cir. 1960).
169. Johansson v. United States, 336 F.2d 809, 813 (5th Cir 1964).
170. See, e.g., Taylor v. Comm'r, 445 F.2d 455, 457 (1st Cir. 1971).
171. See Humana Inc. v. Comm'r, 881 F.2d 247, 257 (6th Cir. 1989); Beech Aircraft Corp. v.
United States, 797 F.2d 920, 923 (10th Cir. 1986); Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53.
172. See Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53 (recognizing the separate legal status of captive
insurance companies); see also supra note 113 and accompanying text.
173. See Barker, supra note 101, at 268.
174. 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 705 (T.C. 1982).
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obtained health insurance policies from its wholly owned insurance
company on behalf of its employees.175  The court found that the
taxpayer's captive "never attempted to accumulate the necessary cash
reserve to conduct such a business," which indicated an entity sham.176
Additionally, the taxpayer never paid the captive any insurance
premiums,177 which indicated a transactional sham. The incongruity
between the legal form of insurance and the actual conduct of the taxpayer
led the court to deny the premium deductions.178
Another example of a transactional sham in captive insurance cases
occurred in Carnation Co. v. Commissioner,179 where insurance was
obtained first through an unrelated intermediary insurance company
(known as a fronting company) which reinsured most of the risk with the
taxpayer's captive. Due to the primary insurer's concern about the claims-
paying capacity of the captive, Carnation agreed to provide additional
capital to the captive to fund the claims payments.80 Such agreement
would indicate that the insured did not really intend the consequences of
insurance, which transfers future losses to another in exchange for the
premium payment. Supplying the wherewithal to pay one's own claims is
not in accordance with the legal rights of insurance. The court denied the
taxpayer's deduction for the premiums because the reality was not
insurance. 181
3. Substance Over Form
There comes a point in viewing the tax consequences of taxpayer
activities when the tax administration and courts see taxation in accord
with the legal form the taxpayer has chosen as raising issues that mock
equitable taxation based on the perceived purposes and objectives of the
legislation. It is common to resort to the doctrine that aims to understand
taxpayers' acts in terms of what is commonly referred to as economic
reality. Simply put, the commonly understood objectives of the legal form
the taxpayer has selected do not appear to be consonant with the broader
economic reality that the taxpayer has achieved. But it is more than that.
It is that the post-tax effect of the private law understanding of the
taxpayer's actions does not appear to be appropriately applied to the post-
tax economic reality that was the taxpayer's true objective.
Substance over form provides that there is a different, non-legal
175. Id.
176. Id at 719.
177. See id.
178. Id.
179. 71 T.C. 400 (1978), aff-d, 640 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1981).
180. Carnation Co. v. Comm'r, 640 F.2d 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 1981).
181. Id. at 1013.
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characterization of the taxpayer's acts that is the appropriate
characterization for tax purposes. The predicate for the search for
economic reality is the inappropriateness of the consequences of the legal
form. Substance over form introduces a new factor in the process of
interpretation that is the tax outcome of the legal form. In a circular
manner, the proper characterization of the activities for tax purposes
depends on a subjective determination of the appropriateness of those
consequences.
Accordingly, substance over form requires a justification for its use.
In some cases, the form will not be followed where there is no purpose for
the use of the legal form other than tax avoidance. This is the so-called
business purpose test.182 In other cases, taxation of individual transactions
will be abandoned for taxation based on an assessment of the overall result
of a series of integrated transactions under the step-transaction doctrine.183
The application of substance over form in captive insurance applies
neither the step-transaction doctrine nor the business purpose test. Instead
of focusing on unjustified tax avoidance, it adopts a more direct economic
assessment of the taxation of the transactions over the legal
consequences. 184
Most captive insurance cases presented to the courts are not easily
resolved by entity or transactional sham. The circumstances in Mobil Oil
Corp. v. United States185 involved a more sophisticated example of the
typical pattern. Mobil set up an insurance subsidiary, GOIC, originally
incorporated in the Bahamas to insure foreign and U.S. operations.186
Though Mobil had experienced insurance personnel working for GOIC
and had a long history of self-insuring its U.S. operations, it, like
Carnation, chose to use an independent third-party insurance company
("AIRCO") to issue policies to Mobil's U.S. corporations.187 AIRCO
reinsured approximately 99% of these risks with GOIC. 88
The starting point for analysis is that the legal form of the insurance
and reinsurance contracts was, in fact, appropriately characterized as
insurance under state law for many purposes.189 One can assume that
where Mobil was required to provide proof of insurance for its operations
182. See generally Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
183. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945).
184. See infra text accompanying note 189.
185. 8 Cl. Ct. 555 (1985).
186. Id. at 558.
187. Id. at 559.
188. Id. at 561.
189. There are other contexts, however, where captive insurance may not be insurance under the
law. See, e.g., Jordan v. Grp. Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239, 250-52 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (a group health
plan was not considered to be insurance regulated by the D.C. Code because the arrangement lacked
risk transfer); Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 127-28 (1982) (similar risk
characteristics are required for classification as the business of insurance under federal antitrust laws).
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under state laws, the states accepted and relied on these contracts at face
value. Additionally, AIRCO was obviously an insurance company
regulated and taxed as such under state and federal laws. The result is that
the parties carefully planned the transactions and the insurance affiliate
complied with all of the requirements of sound insurance practice.
Consequently, the legal form and the parties' actual conduct were
congruent.
Yet, at the same time, there was a different, non-private law
perspective that is obvious from examining captive insurance. This
perspective simply represents the insured making its own provisions for its
risk exposure, which we commonly understand as self-insurance. Mobil's
risk managers recognized as much when they noted:
Approaches to insurance can be roughly categorized as outside
insurance, self-insurance and non-insurance. Outside insurance, of
course, refers to covering insurable risks by paying a premium to a non-
affiliated insurance company in return for an agreement that the
insurance company will indemnify the insured for losses suffered. Self-
insurance is usually handled by setting aside premiums out of current
earnings into a reserve for self-insurance; losses are charged against this
reserve. Self-insurance can also be worked through an insurance
affiliate. Under this system, operating subsidiaries pay premiums to an
affiliated insurance company. Non-insurance means that no provision
at all is made for the insurable risks concerned. 190
Note the contrast between private law's classification of the
transactions as insurance and the financial sector's point of view that
captive insurance represented self-insurance. While the deduction of
insurance premiums is clearly enumerated in the tax law,191 self-insurance
is neither a category of private law nor of tax law because neither is
concerned with non-transactions with oneself. 192 Neither the tax nor the
private law perspective sees a transaction resulting in an expenditure or
loss of control over the funds with self-insurance. The private law form of
a transaction by a related corporation with a captive insurance company
also lacks the elements of an economic transaction, resulting in an
190. Defendant's Exhibit No. 7, app. 2, at 1, Mobil, 8 Cl. Ct. 555 (No. 358-78) (reprinting Adams,
Economics of Self Insurance, in AN INSURANCE PROGRAM FOR MOBIL OVERSEAS (1958)) (copy on
file); see Barker, supra note 101, at 284 n. 66.
191. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (1993) ("Among the items included in business expenses
are . . . insurance premiums against fire, storm, theft, [and) accident. . . .").
192. However, Congress has long provided special treatment for self-insurance. For example, in
1958 Congress passed an amendment to § 1231 of the Internal Revenue Code to provide special tax
relief for the self-insured. See Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 49(a), 72
Stat. 1606, 1642 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 123 1(a)(4)(C) (2014)). As the Senate Committee on
Finance subsequently explained, the 1958 amendment was enacted to benefit business taxpayers who
self-insure their business properties. S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 2055-56 (1969), as reprinted in 1969
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027. Casualty losses on their business properties were excepted from § 1231 (and,
thus, are fully deductible against ordinary income) in view of the fact that amounts added to their self-
insurance reserves against casualty losses are not deductible, although premiums paid to an outside
insurance company for the same purpose by business taxpayers who are not self-insurers are
deductible. Id. at 2128.
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expenditure and loss of control from the financial view of insurance.
Clearly, however, the differing views are in response to different
questions.
The tax understanding requires another question to be answered. In
order for substance to prevail over private law characterization, for tax
purposes, a countervailing financial view of reality must negate a legal
view of reality, because the private law view of captive insurance usually
categorizes the transaction as insurance provided by insurance companies.
Both the private law and the financial understandings present different
bona fide views of reality. However, those differing views are in response
to different objectives. Tax law must determine which of these views are
more relevant to its objective.
Such a perfect contradiction is rare in tax law. The decision for tax
law is which view represents the description of the facts that the
legislation meant when it provided a deduction for "all the ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on
any trade or business."193 In general, the courts that have dealt with
captive insurance have assumed that Congress required an evaluation of
the economic consequences of the captive insurance arrangement.194
These courts have generally found that a critical element of what an
insurance product does is transferring the financial consequences of an
insured's losses to another.195 The courts uniformly agreed that a parent
corporation did not transfer that risk when the insurer was its
subsidiary. 196
Most substance over form formulates the issue as a conflict between
a private law characterization of the facts and an economic one. Where
the government is successful, the legal characterization is found wanting.
The captive insurance cases place the conflict in a slightly different light.
Both assessments of taxpayer acts have validity in their field. The legal
form of insurance provides valid insights as to what third parties and other
insurance companies recognize as insurance and reinsurance. Private law
understandings are followed for tax purposes in the normal case because
they do have the intended economic consequences that are relevant for tax
purposes. In captive insurance cases where premiums are paid to wholly-
owned insurance affiliates, the courts must take a deeper look by exploring
193. I.R.C. § 162(a) (2012).
194. See, e.g., Cloughery Packing Co. v. Comm'r, 811 F.2d 1297, 1305 (9th Cir. 1987).
195. See, e.g., Mobil, 8 Cl. Ct. at 566.
196. See, e.g., Clougherty, 811 F.2d at 1298; Steams-Roger Corp. v. United States, 774 F.2d 414,
417 (10th Cit. 1985); Carnation Co. v. Comm'r, 640 F.2d 1010, 1013 (9th Cir. 1981); Beech Aircraft
Corp. v. United States, 797 F.2d 920, 923 (10th Cir. 1986); Mobil, 8 Cl. Ct. at 558; Humana, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 881 F.2d 247, 257 (6th Cir. 1989); Aesthesia Serv. Med. Grp., Inc. v. Comm'r, 85 T.C. 1031,
1040-42 (1985); but see Crawford Fitting Co. v. United States, 606 F. Supp. 136, 145 (N.D. Ohio
1985) (finding that the economic risk of loss was shifted to the captive insurance company).
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alternative perspectives of reality and consider adopting these economic
insights in order to get the facts of taxation right. Otherwise, the purposes
behind the tax legislation would be negated in these situations. This
emphasizes the point made in the introduction that the private law is not
the only area of knowledge available in interpreting taxpayer actions in tax
law. In substance over form, the economic analysis does not negate the
truth of private law characterization; it instead finds that characterization
does not achieve the same purpose as the statute, because private law's
form does not achieve the economic result upon which the deduction is
based.
4. The Civil Law and Substance Over Form
In the past, Germany, a civil law jurisdiction, adopted "economic
interpretation" of tax laws, which required consideration of "the social
viewpoint, the purpose, and the economic significance of the tax laws and
the development of the [situation]."1 97 The objective of the provision was
to overrule the excessively restrictive interpretation of the tax laws that
had been developed from concepts and categories of tax law based on
legal form.198
Economic interpretation in Germany was short-lived, and it is no
longer the law. 199 Civil law systems, however, do have versions of
substance over form which are the venerable doctrines of abuse of or fraud
on the law.200 These doctrines differ from simulation and the American
doctrines of sham and substance over form, in that they require a
malicious or improper motive on the part of the party to achieve legal
rights outside the intendment of the civil law form.201 As applied to tax in
the Netherlands, for example, the legal form will be set aside where: "[1]
tax reduction was the dominant reason for the transaction, [2] the
transaction lacks economic effect, and [3] the intended tax consequences
violate the intention of the law." 202
After analyzing the U.S. captive insurance cases, one might expect
positive responses to all three questions, but that is not the case. In
applying this doctrine, a business purpose for the legal form or the
undertaking is sufficient to defeat the application of the doctrine. For
captive insurance, purposes like better risk management and retaining the
197. See Frans Vanistendael, Legal Framework for Taxation, in I TAX LAW DESIGN AND
DRAFTING 1, 23 n. 101 (Victor Thuronyi ed., 1996),
https://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/nft/1998/tlaw/eng/ch2.pdf [https://perma.cc/T52U-U9WU]
(citation omitted).
198. Id. at 23 (citing KARL LARENZ, METHODENLEHRE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT (1983)).
199. Id.
200. See infra notes 202-208 and accompanying text.
201. See THURONYI, supra note 131, at 157.
202. Id. at 159.
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profits that would be earned otherwise by unrelated insurance companies
are sufficient.203 Thus, outside the United States, it is generally accepted
that setting up a foreign captive insurance company advances a bona fide
purpose.204  Such business purposes make it virtually impossible to
demonstrate that the dominant motive was tax reduction. These business
purposes also provide an economic justification for the form that is
sufficient, even though it is not the economic effect of risk transfer that is
considered necessary by the U.S. courts. Finally, it can be said that the
intended tax consequence is in sync with the intendment of allowing
deductions for insurance premiums.
In addition, the basis of the doctrine of abuse of the law is that the
taxpayer has used a legal form to "reach a factual situation" that could
have been reached by a compatible legal form with a different tax
incidence that, unlike the chosen form, is in keeping with the legislative
purpose.205 The result is that taxation will be based on "the legal form of
the transaction that is appropriate to the legal factual situation."206 Thus,
in order to recharacterize the transaction from the taxpayer's chosen legal
form to the legal form that carries out the legislative intent, similarity in
fact is not sufficient. Additionally, the old facts, which include legal
rights and obligations, must fit the new legal form.207 The significant
private law implications of captive insurance simply do not fit a legal
recharacterization as self-insurance because legally recognized
transactions occur between legally recognized entities. Thus, the result of
tax following form comes from an inability or an inherent choice that it is
not appropriate to seek an economic meaning different from a private law
meaning for taxation. This attitude represents a profound difference from
American tax law. For these reasons, captive insurance has not been
considered impermissible tax avoidance outside the United States.
V. INTERNATIONAL TAX ARBITRAGE: THE SURPRISING CONSEQUENCE OF
THE DIFFERING NATIONAL APPROACHES TO PRIVATE LAW MEANING FOR
TAXATION
This research has explored the role private law plays in the
interpretation of tax statutes in both the common law and the civil law
traditions. Though the starting points have been the same, this research
203. See, e.g., Captive Insurance Companies in Europe - The Benefits of Internal Risk Coverage,
BRYAN CAVE (Sept. 2013), https://www.bryancave.com/images/content/2/0/v2/2017/Bryan-Cave-
LLP-Client-Bulletin-Captive-Insurance-Companies-in-Eu.pdf [https://perma.cc/8GHF-TJKN]; see
also Barker, supra note 101, at 270-74.
204. See Brian J. Arnold, The Canadian Anti-Avoidance Rule, in BRITISH TAX REv. 239 n. 24
(1995).
205. Vanistendael, supra note 17, at 138.
206. Id. at 149 (German standard for their version of abuse of legal constitution).
207. Id. at 133.
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has articulated many instances of substantial variation in the dominance of
legal form in the interpretation of tax statutes. In particular, while the
norm is strict interpretation in accordance with legal consequences, some
nations, like the United States, have interpreted some categories of tax law
more substantively, resulting in a more economic or social understanding
of the facts of taxation.
In the domestic context, nations' differing approaches to
interpretation typically achieve consistent results through the equal
application of literal or more substantive interpretation to all taxpayers.
Coherence in tax results is a product of the matching of expenditure and
receipt under uniform characterization.208 For example, if the tax law
characterization is debt, an interest deduction is matched by an interest
inclusion.209 Where there is deviation from this norm, like in the case of
deductible interest paid to an exempt charity,210 or non-deductible
(personal) interest paid to a taxable creditor,211 this is the result of explicit
national tax policy applied differently to the parties involved in the same
transaction. However, an unintended,212  but clearly foreseeable
consequence of different approaches to the tax meaning of transactions
and organizations is the effect they have on cross-border transactions.
This is the fertile soil of international tax arbitrage, which exploits the
structural discontinuities caused by the different tax treatment by different
nations of the same transactions.213 Such inconsistencies in the treatment
of the resulting cash flows can be caused by simple differences in how the
tax rules deal with the same legal transactions,214  different
characterization of the transactions by nations' private law,215 or different
reliance on private law characterizations,216 in contrast with economic or
208. OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHARING 9 (2013),
https://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf [https://perma.ccIH82T-4JX8].
209. I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(1)-(4), 163 (2012) (inclusion of interest income and deduction of interest
payments).
210. Id. § 501(a), (c) (tax exemption for certain charities).
211. Id. § 163(h) (denial of deduction for personal interest).
212. In addressing the problem of dual residence companies, the Senate Finance Committee
remarked: "The committee does not believe that the United States Senate wittingly agreed to an
international tax system where taxpayers making cross-border investments, and only those taxpayers,
could reduce or eliminate their U.S. corporate tax through self-help and gain an advantage over U.S.
persons who make similar investments." S. Rep. No. 99-313, at 422 (1986).
213. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, MARKETS IN VICE, MARKETS IN VIRTUE 121 (2005); see also
Michael S. Knoll, Financial Innovation, Tax Arbitrage, and Retrospective Taxation, The Problem with
Passive Government Lending, 52 TAx L. REv. 199, 199-200 (1997).
214. An example would be the classification of an expenditure as current and deductible in one
system and capital and non-deductible in another.
215. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (discussing the different characterizations of
sale and lease).
216. Compare, e.g., Hormung v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 428, 435 (1967) (the fact that an
American football player received an award for great achievements in sports from a person who was
not his employer was not determinative in finding that the award was income), with Moor v. Griffiths,
[1972] 1 W.L.R. 1024, 1034-35 (Ch.). In Moor, an English football player received a bonus from
organizations that were not his employer. Moor, I W.L.R. at 1027. This was determinative in finding
that he did not have income. Id. at 1034-35.
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financial characterizations. This Part focuses on the last two causes, by
examining the international tax treatment of debt versus equity and lease
versus sale.
A. Debt Versus Equity
The distinction between debt and equity is well recognized
throughout the world. It refers to a debtor-creditor transaction where the
creditor transfers money to a debtor in return for the debtor's promise to
repay the principle with interest in a certain time frame.217 Equity, on the
other hand, represents an ownership interest in property or an
enterprise.218 Income taxation typically distinguishes these transactions
by permitting, in the case of loans, the deduction of the interest
expenditure by the debtor and the inclusion in income of the receipt by the
creditor.2 1 9
Income generally includes dividends from stock,. but now provides
rates that differ from those applied to interest.220 Dividends are not
typically deductible by the payor corporation,221 whereas interest
expenditures are.222
A cross-border transaction has the distinct possibility of being
characterized differently by two or more countries. For example,
corporation X resident in country A funds a subsidiary Y resident in
country B that is treated as debt in country B, but as equity in country
A. 223 This results in an interest deduction in country B and exempt
dividend in country A. Alternatively, the dividend, while taxable, would
be classified as foreign source income in country A, and would be entitled
to an indirect foreign tax credit for the taxes paid by subsidiary Y to
country B. In addition, inclusion of the dividend and subsidiary Y's
income for purposes of the dividend gross-up in company X's foreign tax
credit limit could result in a larger foreign tax credit in country A. 224 I
many cases, this can result in an elimination of any tax due on the
dividend. This results because country B takes the private law debt
217. HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 380-81 (1983).
218. Id. at 383.
219. See OECD, HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS: TAx POLICY AND COMPLIANCE ISSUES 37
(March 2012) http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/HYBRIDSENGFinal
October2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/H87M-EJJG].
220. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 243 (2006) (dividend received deduction); I.R.C. § 1(h)(1 1) (2014) (special
15% rate on dividends).
221. Several nations, however, have experimented with alternative corporate-shareholder
integration systems that allow a deduction to the corporation for dividends as to permit a reduced
corporate rate for profits used to pay dividends. See BEN TERRA & PETER WATEL, EUROPEAN TAX
LAW 166-69 (Kluwer 3d ed., 2001).
222. See I.R.C. § 163(a) (2012).




characterization of the loan agreement,225 whereas country A takes a more
substantive view of the distinction between debt and equity for tax
purposes. In the United States, for example, private law debt instruments
are often classified as equity under a multi-factor test aimed at finding the
true nature of an investment hat is in the form of debt.226
B. Lease, Sale, or Loan
A second common mismatch arrangement is a transaction that takes
the legal form of a lease but which can be, in many cases, a transaction
that has some of the aspects of a sale or financing arrangement. For
example, in a sale lease-back transaction, corporation X transfers an asset
to Y as a private law sale and Y leases the property to X for a fair market
value rent. In general, most nations accept the tax validity of the
independent private law classifications of transaction 1 as a sale and
transaction 2 as a lease.227 However, where the series of transactions
provides that X has the right or obligation to repurchase the property after
the lease expires, a more substantive approach can end up reclassifying X
as the owner, even though Y is a lessee under private law.228 This can
lead to what is referred to as a double-dip lease where the different tax
rules of the lessor and lessee's nations permit each to be treated as the
owner of the equipment or real property for the allowance of depreciation
and characterization of the cash flow. 229 Due to the popularity of
exploiting this discontinuity, at least one country, the Republic of Ireland,
has designed a flexible regime for capital allowances or depreciation. 230
225. This strong attachment o legal form is shown by a United Kingdom case where a pension
fund loaned £20 million to an investment company so the investment company could pay the lender
E20 million interest that it already owed. Even though it was unlikely that the investment company
could repay the loan, it was still a loan in form, and the payment constituted deductible interest.
McNiven v. Westmoreland Inv. Ltd. [1997] STC 1103, 1143-44 (HL U.K.).
226. Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694, 696 (3d Cir. 1968); see also Laid Law
Transp., Inc. v. Comm'r, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2598, at *22 (1998). The Internal Revenue Service
ordinarily will not issue rulings on debt versus stock classification, because it concludes that the issue
is "primarily one of fact." Rev. Proc. 2013-3, 2013-1 IRB. 113.
227. See, e.g., Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 584 (1978) ("[S]o long as the lessor
retains significant and genuine attributes of the traditional lessor status, the form of the transaction
governs for tax purposes."); see also Leslie Co. v. Comm'r, 539 F.2d 943, 949 (3d Cir. 1976).
228. See, e.g., Frank Lyon Co., 435 U.S. at 584; Leslie Co., 539 F.2d at 949.
229. See Chapman & Cutler LLP, Multi-Tier Double-Dip Cross-Border Leasing,
http://www.chapman.com/practices-multi-tier-double-border-leasing.html [https://perma.cc/A8DT-
7GBK]. These transactions are very popular for equipment leasing involving France, England, and
Japan, for example. Id.
230. See Deloitte, Leasing in Ireland Crossing Borders,
https://www2.deloitte.com/ie/en/pages/tax/articles/leasing-in-ireland-crossing-borders.html
[https://perma.cc/5M49-AX54]. In Ireland, it may be possible for the lessor/owner/financer under
private law to claim deductions for capital allowances on the basis of either legal or economic
ownership of the asset. Id. Ireland, therefore, is a good fit with other jurisdictions to secure the
benefits of double-dip cross-border leases. Id.
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C. Recharacterizing Private Law Transactions
Throughout the world, tax systems are being challenged and
weakened by the proliferation of tax avoidance, both domestically and
internationally.231 In many countries, the remedy has been for legislators
to enact rules aimed at eliminating tax benefits, known as general anti-
avoidance rules ("GAARs"), where the taxpayer's primary purpose was to
obtain a tax benefit.232
This statutory inadequacy can be explained. The legal method of the
tax profession is central to the efficacy of tax planning and tax avoidance.
Tax avoidance can be seen to take advantage of the gap between the intent
or object of the statute in taxing a particular situation the way it does or
the purpose of the statue in giving a particular benefit to the taxpayer, and
the tax outcome advanced by the taxpayer.233 Where avoidance succeeds,
the judge adopts a tax outcome for the taxpayer based on a possible
reading of the statute that can be perceived as conflicting with an
interpretation that accords with the statute's context, intent, and purpose.
Literal interpretation of tax statutes is the necessary outcome of a liberal
tradition of individual rights that supports the right of taxpayers to plan
and avoid taxation.234 Today in America, this dogma is represented by the
textualists. It depends upon the inability of tax concepts to intercede
directly with material conditions.235
Despite the dominance of literalism in the judicial method, today
legislators and administrators are asking judges more and more to reflect
economic reality in their determinations of tax consequences.236
Especially outside the United States, many judges still reject this role,
relying instead on the view that a taxpayer who satisfies the private law
form referenced by the statute is entitled to the benefit of the plan.237
Even judges in civil law countries who are used to purposive
interpretation, gap-filling, and the analogical development of statutes238
that could provide a method for applying substance in tax matters resist
the application of these doctrines in tax law, because the idea of an
economic meaning to tax terms different from the private law
231. See HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 219, at 5.
232. See, e.g., Income Tax Assessment Act of 1936, Part IVA, § 177D.
233. See William B. Barker, The Ideology of Tax Avoidance, 40 LoY. CHI. L. J. 229, 232 (2009).
234. Id.at237-38.
235. See Barker, supra note 21, at 865-66 (for a general discussion of textualism and taxation).
Examples of textualist scholarship include: Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes Domains, 50 U. CHI. L.
REv. 533 (1983); Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of
Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179 (1986-87).
236. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7701(o) (2012) (application of the economic substance doctrine).
237. See HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION 16 (Australia),
33 (Canada), 131 (United Kingdom) (2d ed., 2004).
238. See Barker, supra note 21, at 870-73.
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understanding is contrary to traditional views of the rule of law.239
Formal legal transactions that are normally determinative for tax,
however, can often present false appearances of the economic and social
reality that the tax law seeks to encompass. In these circumstances, the
judge reifies tax concepts, treating the private law form as the real thing,
as opposed to actual material conditions taxpayers achieve.
Even where judges attempt to apply the statute in accordance with
legislative intent, as jurists, their method is chained to private law
concepts and methodologies. In order to adopt a non-private law analysis,
the judge will attempt to reclassify the taxpayer's facts by replacing the
old legal form with a new legal form that has different tax implications.240
For this reason, some European courts require that when the government
argues that the legal form does not reflect the taxpayer's situation, the
government must demonstrate that the actual facts satisfy the legal form
that the government asserts supports the proper tax analysis.241 Courts
will not recharacterize the transaction unless the facts clearly fit the new
form.
Where substance seeks to prevail over form, the rejected private law
form, however, has not lost its claim to be a reflection of reality. Indeed,
even if it is not determinative for tax law purposes, it cannot lose its reality
for private law purposes. By necessity, the reality of the new legal form is
in conflict with the acts of the taxpayer, as seen through the reality of the
old legal form. Because legal method lacks a clear rationale for this
transformation of taxpayers' acts, the new form cannot help but be seen as
distorting our understanding of the taxpayer's situation. Where all
avenues produce distortions, liberal legal methodology will lead to a
finding for the taxpayer supporting clever tax planning and avoidance.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is generally recognized that the judiciary in the United States, led
by the U.S. Supreme Court starting in the 1930s, abandoned strict
interpretation of tax statutes for a more contextual, purposeful
approach,242 for the avowed reason that literal interpretation "would often
defeat the object intended to be accomplished."243 The Court remarked
that a statute should be interpreted "in accordance with its design and
purpose, sacrificing, if necessary, the literal meaning in order that the
239. See AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 237, at 50 (France), 69 (Germany), 86 (Japan), 99
(Netherlands), 112 (Sweden).
240. The requirement that the facts fit a new legal form which forms the basis of the tax charge is
an absolute requirement of anti-avoidance methodology in civil law systems.
241. See VANISTENDAEL, supra note 17, at 133, 149.
242. See Helvering v. Stockhomes Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 93 (1934).
243. Helvering v. N.Y. Trust Co., 292 U.S. 455, 464 (1934).
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purpose may not fail. 244 Through the time of the Warren Court, American
courts in many cases have expanded the reach of income taxation and
thwarted tax avoidance.24 5
However, substantial criticism has been aimed at such judicial
activism, claiming that many decisions are extra-legal, a usurpation of
legislative authority, and are unprincipled and arbitrary for the reason that
these decisions abandon the legal certainty provided by interpreting tax
law in terms of private law categories and methods.24 6 These criticisms
have struck a chord with the liberal ideology, which supports the
traditional limitations on the judicial method in taxation.
On the surface, the context of this statutory hole is the classic divide
between literal (and its modem manifestation-textualism) and purposive
interpretation. The formal distinctions between the philosophies can only
explain so much, however, because there is an element of literalism in
those espousing purposivism and there is an element of purposivism in
those espousing literalism. Put practically, there is always some substance
to legal form.247 There is, however, a significant difference in the
philosophical approaches by which meaning is assigned to language in the
tax act. The history of tax jurisprudence in America shows these
significant differences.
Since the days of the Warren Court,24 8 the judiciary in America has
steadily moved toward a more literalist approach to the interpretation of
tax legislation.249 One consequence of this trend is that the use of
dictionary meanings for tax terms has increased exponentially.250 Tax
avoidance's domain is the shadow world that results from the
incongruence between statutory language and material conditions. The
dictionary meaning of words separated from their tax context and divorced
from the legislation's purposes are words without a point of view. They
are words that the interpreter can choose any perspective to interpret them
from.251 This focus on dictionary meanings and plain meaning has
mystified the real source for meaning in the literal interpretation of tax
law, however. This source is private law and legal form.
The very nature of legal method and argumentation, however, places
244. Id. at 465.
245. See Barker, supra note 21, at 850-59 (discussing the development by the Supreme Court).
246. Id. at 865-66.
247. See BORIS BITTKER, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 1-17 (1988).
248. See Barker, supra note 21, at 830-32, 850-59 (tracing the change from formalism to
intentionalism in the U.S. Supreme Court's approach to interpretation that took place from 1930-
1956).
249. See Mary L. Heen, Plain Meaning, the Tax Code, and Doctrinal Incoherence, 48 HASTINGS
L.J. 771, 771 (1997).
250. See David F. Shores, Textualism and Intentionalism in Tax Litigation, 61 TAX LAWYER 53,
63 (2007).
251. See generally Barker, supra note 233.
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private law in between tax law and tax law's subject matter. The key
interconnection between tax law concepts, which are abstractions of social
and economic relations, and these conditions of existence become
increasingly complicated and hidden by the intermediate abstractions of
private law. Where private law form distorts our understanding of the
economic base, tax avoiders have a free rein to exploit these anomalies
with predictable results. The consequence is an environment rich in
avoidance possibilities.
This paper asserts that a justifiable judicial model dealing with tax
avoidance in a democratic society can only be developed by liberating tax
reasoning from the dominance of private law understandings. This can be
done by relegating private law to the status of a factor in assessing the
material socio-economic conditions that tax law deals with. In most cases,
private law will reflect those real-world conditions as envisioned by the
tax law. In other cases, the private law will mask those conditions. The
jurist's role is to see through the private law fagade to the actual material
conditions.
In these situations, since the statutory concepts must have a direct,
unmediated connection with socio-economic conditions, private law
characterizations should have little impact on the resolution of the tax
issue. That means that the legal method of the tax jurist is not simply to
interpret tax concepts through the lens of legal form, but to open up
interpretation to knowledge provided by other relevant sciences. In other
words, there are other ways to read material conditions for tax law
purposes besides those provided by legal form that are necessary in order
to understand and apply the science of income taxation.
Proper method views a taxpayer's situation from many angles, as an
individual, a family member, a parent, a worker, a business person, and an
investor. These aspects of the human condition require the points of view
of economics, finance, law, and even scientific inquiry into personal
relationships. Otherwise, limiting tax law's reading of socio-economic
conditions to legal form can be expected to distort, in some cases, tax's
ability to properly assess those conditions in light of the objects and
purposes of tax law.
168 [Vol. 57
